read story | posted by worldcup2002 to Baseball at 4:37 PM CDT (44 comments total)
posted by jeffmshaw at 4:46 PM CDT on February 16
posted by billsaysthis at 4:51 PM CDT on February 16
posted by worldcup2002 at 4:51 PM CDT on February 16
posted by jasonspaceman at 4:55 PM CDT on February 16
posted by worldcup2002 at 4:58 PM CDT on February 16
posted by dusted at 5:09 PM CDT on February 16
posted by jerseygirl at 5:24 PM CDT on February 16
posted by wfrazerjr at 6:13 PM CDT on February 16
posted by worldcup2002 at 7:05 PM CDT on February 16
posted by Bernreuther at 7:17 PM CDT on February 16
posted by goddam at 7:21 PM CDT on February 16
posted by jasonspaceman at 5:46 AM CDT on February 17
posted by tieguy at 7:39 AM CDT on February 17
posted by mbd1 at 9:53 AM CDT on February 17
posted by dusted at 11:49 AM CDT on February 17
posted by garfield at 12:02 PM CDT on February 17
posted by dusted at 12:09 PM CDT on February 17
posted by jasonspaceman at 12:38 PM CDT on February 17
I was on a quest to find relevant relationships. Usually it wasn't as simple as "if X then Y." I was looking for probabilistic relationships. I christened the new model in the front office: "be the house." Every season we play 162 games. Individual players amass over 600 plate appearances. Starting pitchers face 1,000 hitters. We have plenty of sample size. I encouraged everyone to think of the house advantage in everything we did. We may not always be right but we'd be right a lot more often than we'd be wrong. In baseball, if you win about 60% of your games, you're probably in the playoffs.
One of the other problems is that the traditional metrics and stats used in baseball are muddied with so much noise that just didn't matter that I was having a tough time distilling all the information. I decided to throw it all out and start all over with no assumptions. I built a Markov model, or actuarial table, for the last five or ten years that recorded what had actually happened in the course of every major league baseball game.
From that research I was able to figure out that a man on first with nobody out is worth "X" runs and a man on second with two outs is worth "Y" runs. From there I was able to jump to understanding what it means to have someone who can hit a lot of doubles. What was the value of that event and others? I went a step further and asked who the people were who could add these value—enhancing skills to our team. Finally I was able to figure out what the cost of each of those activities was and what the margins were. This was process versus outcome. I just didn't believe the outcomes that the traditional stats were giving us.
Once the research was complete, debated and stress—tested (which took years) we had considerable new knowledge, and a lot of it was pretty startling. Now remember that we hadn't really invented anything. We had only discovered relationships that were already there. Fortunately for us, most of them were contrary to popular opinion. These discoveries ranged from broad philosophical ideas, such as the fact that 90% of the player population in major league baseball is replaceable by someone who makes less to the very minute detail, such as pitch counts or control of the strike zone. What I ended up doing was creating a whole new set of metrics around this objective core. When I was done we had stats but not in the traditional sense. It was an entirely new operating system. It wasn't an upgrade from Subjective 1.0 to Subjective 2.0. It was more like "Winning Baseball 1.0."
posted by smithers at 2:22 PM CDT on February 17
"Billy Beane is not a statistical innovator. Paul DePodesta is not some magical number cruncher who enters data into a computer and comes out with baseball gold. The statistics extolled in "Moneyball" as being revolutionary are well behind the curve. Any casual, intelligent fan who strolls over to baseballprimer.com or baseballprospectus.com can see that what Lewis has Beane touting as genius is already passé.
Granted, what Beane accepts on a statistical level is more than any other GM (with the possible exceptions of Red Sox executive Theo Epstein and the Blue Jays' JP Ricciardi), but that does not make him a genius. It just means that Beane is not a fool, because the GMs that ignore this data that can be freely had are utterly inept."
posted by worldcup2002 at 6:21 PM CDT on February 17
posted by jasonspaceman at 6:35 PM CDT on February 17
posted by dusted at 6:49 PM CDT on February 17
posted by smithers at 8:37 PM CDT on February 17
posted by jasonspaceman at 8:40 PM CDT on February 17
posted by smithers at 8:40 PM CDT on February 17
posted by smithers at 8:41 PM CDT on February 17
posted by wfrazerjr at 8:49 PM CDT on February 17
posted by smithers at 8:51 PM CDT on February 17
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posted by smithers at 9:02 PM CDT on February 17
posted by garfield at 10:01 PM CDT on February 17
posted by worldcup2002 at 12:45 AM CDT on February 18
posted by jasonspaceman at 6:15 AM CDT on February 18
posted by worldcup2002 at 10:00 AM CDT on February 18
posted by jeffmshaw at 11:43 AM CDT on February 18
posted by jasonspaceman at 11:54 AM CDT on February 18
posted by dusted at 1:00 PM CDT on February 18
posted by worldcup2002 at 2:04 PM CDT on February 18
"We first started attacking it with the Markoff Model. We tried to figure out what is the value of every situation during the course of a Major League Baseball game.
In every situation of bases and outs, we figured out the Expected Run Value of that situation, based on what actually happened over the course of the previous five to ten seasons in the American League. We could start figuring out that a man on first with one out was worth .94 runs, and if you bunted that guy to second successfully, you just went down to .673 runs. So we started realizing that a lot of the traditional baseball stuff was just wrong. We started coming up with the math to prove it.
We tried to figure out with every individual player what those players actually deserved to get on every play. If the guy hit a line drive that ended up getting caught for an out, he got more credit for that. He got the credit based on what happened on that play over the course of the previous ten years of Major League Baseball. That bloop double that falls in is a double in the box score isn't a double for us. It is a very low-rated play. And that line drive, and the ball that was going over the wall that gets pulled back in by the center fielder - those plays represent a lot of value for the hitter, because more often than not those were runs.
When we were done we had created an entirely new set of metrics that didn't resemble traditional statistics at all. There was no relation whatsoever, and what it showed was that there was tremendous inefficiency. There was a gross mis-allocation of credit and blame going on in traditional statistics. With our own metrics we were able to figure out not only what the value of every situation was, but what players were most likely to put us in the most advantageous situations. We did not necessarily care what they had done in the traditional box score for the previous five years, but what should have happened because of the way they played over the course of the previous five years.
It created a tremendous inefficiency in our market, and we started realizing the value of all these players who were available to us for greatly undervalued prices, because they had been miscast or biased against for some reason. Once we started cooking up all this stuff, we realized that it was very contrary to public opinion. That was tough because ultimately we had to implement it with our people. We had to convince our staff and convince our player development people that this was truth, this wasn't opinion, and this is what we were going to do going forward. We are continuing to tweak it, continuing to stress test everything that we do, and continuing to try to make it better, but we were already so far ahead of everybody else at the time."
As Bill said when he introduced me, I think the fundamental thing that we found is that baseball wasn't about tools. It was about skills. You can be a great athlete, you can run the 40-yard sprint in 4.2 seconds in, but if you couldn't hit, it just didn't matter. If you didn't have the skill to consistently put the bat on the ball, put it in play hard somewhere, it didn't matter what you could do.
And this definitely goes for all the other sports. The NFL Combine, which is the major scouting event where they bring in all the top college prospects and all the NFL people are there, the two most publicized things in the combine are the 40 yard dash, and how many time each player can bench press 225 pounds. So what happens if you can run a 40-yard dash in 4.3 seconds, bench 225 pounds 30 times, and you can't make a tackle?
In the NBA, what if you can jump out of the gym but you can't shoot? Or play defense? These are sports, but they're not just pure athletic contests. What they are is games of skill. Just like golf. Who's the biggest and strongest golfer on the Tour? I have no idea. I know the best player is Tiger Woods, but he's not the biggest or strongest guy, the fastest or anything else. These are skill games, so what we need to do is start measuring the skills. Measure the skills and not the tools.
Bill: Is anyone using your process in other sports, or in political campaigns? What are the dumb things people are doing in football?
Paul: People are certainly interested in it, that's for sure. Once Money Ball came out we had calls from NFL teams, NBA teams, NHL teams, and a lot of college programs that want to institute some of these ideas. I've talked to and met with a handful of NFL teams, just because football is one of my passions, so it's a little bit easier for me and more interesting for me to do. I think a lot of the same things exist. Certainly all of the metrics would have to be completely different. There are some things about football or basketball that make it even more complex - if an offensive lineman doesn't do his job, the quarterback doesn't even have a chance to do his, so how do you measure that? How do you account for that?
There would be some obstacles, but I think the very core of skill versus tools is absolutely relevant to all the other games. And not just games, probably a lot of businesses. Even for all of you in terms of what you're measuring, if you could figure out what the tools are and what the skills are. Out of all that financial information that comes out of every company, or that I can pull up on MSNBC, how much of that is really relevant and how much of it is noise? That fundamental philosophy probably carries over to a lot more than just baseball.
posted by worldcup2002 at 2:41 PM CDT on February 18
posted by yerfatma at 3:25 PM CDT on February 18
posted by worldcup2002 at 4:21 PM CDT on February 18
posted by worldcup2002 at 4:24 PM CDT on February 18
Primer: Do you find that part of the reason some of these ideas are so slow to catch on has to do with the way baseball is reported?
Lewis: There’s no question that the source of baseball’s bull-headedness is partly the media coverage of it. It’s just that, the sheer numbers of unthinking people who are either scouts or reporters, or more likely, columnist types, who don’t want to have to think, who are insulted when it’s suggested there’s this thing that maybe they don’t know all about, that’s in the middle of their world, that’s new and different, they’re insulted and threatened. I do think that is a force for resisting change. But I hate to generalize about the media, because I’ve been generalized about before. There are so many good ones, that you don’t want to say they’re all kind of the same, and they’re all bad. There are bad ones and good ones.
The bad ones are really bad—it’s just how bad the bad ones are that I can’t stand. I’ve run across a dozen of these guys whose stuff I’ve read, who I can’t find a single redeeming trait, not in spirit, not in their ability to craft a sentence, not in the freshness of their observations, not even in their ability to get an original quote. And yet they maintain their little corner of the newspaper.
And some of them don’t even seem to be enjoying what they do. Well, clearly, they don’t like what they’re doing. How could they like what they’re doing? There’s no excellence there; it’s just horrible. So, those kind of people are going to be threatened, because this is going to force them to actually do some work. They’re going to have to actually learn something here. And it’s insulting because it suggests that they’ve been writing all along with this big thing going on in their sport, with this thing that they’ve been oblivious to.
posted by worldcup2002 at 5:31 PM CDT on February 18
posted by jasonspaceman at 5:35 PM CDT on February 18
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I might just follow the Dodgers (and the MLB, for that matter) this upcoming season just to see how their GM fares ...